What is not, perhaps, adequately stressed in the Report is how diverse trends are among countries and, within many, how much divergence there is from crop to crop.
Second, external factors have played a major negative role. The Bank cites (chapter 3, pages wars and civil strife; drought and poor rainfall patterns; and extension of cultivation into less productive and more drought-prone areas. Most observers would also cite external terms of trade shifts (which provide a negative price incentive if passed on). The Bank's data which show these as positive for agricultural exports prior to 1978 (pages 18-21) is questionable since much is based on global averages (given weak national data) and does not seem to square with fragmentary national data. However, between 1977 However, between -82 (and for mineral exporters between 1970 there is agreement that global terms of trade shifts were highly negative. The unfortunate make-up of African non-fuel exports (concentrated in low global demand growth products) is also an agreed negative external (or at least inherited) factor.
Third, it is critical to raise production of both domestic food and export/industrial crops. The Bank's target is 3.8 per cent overall for agriculture (probably 3.5 per cent food and 4.0 per cent export/industrial -page 122). The area of divergence is concealed, for the Agenda totally avoids considering distributional aspects lucidly or even coherently. Apparently it believes output growth can or should come primarily from existing better off smaliholders (page 52).
Fourth, incentives -both price and non-price, are needed. But in its chapter on agriculture this Agenda deals only with incentives which are directly agricultural (health, water, education, for example, are excluded). Such an approach may be seen as both too economistic and too narrowly sectoral, even to encourage cost efficiency of incentives used to raise production.
Fifth, peasant.participation in decision-making and policy design is cited en passant as a key goal. How common this ground is remains unclear. There is little real articulation. The whole thrust of the chapter bears few marks of having used surveys of peasant opinion, or having designed policies in terms of testing them against, or modifying them in light of peasant preferences.
Sixth, the need to select clear priorities (and therefore to choose and to exclude) and to articulate policies, programmes, projects from them is broadly agreed. The divergencies are on what the priorities are and how much they vary among themselves.
Seventh, there are significant, remediable public policy inefficiencies in two senses: inconsistencies within policy/programme/project packages and the use of more scarce resources than are needed to carry out policies (including commercial institutional performance). However, to the extent that judgments on priorities diverge, a third category of inefficiencies, namely wrong priorities and/or objectives, may not be common ground.
Eighth, more data are needed, a point which the Report repeatedly stresses. It is not clear what is happening, because present qualitative and quantitative data are of dubious quality, fragmentary and inconsistent.' Without more data, analyses of the same events will often be quite different on factual as well as normative grounds, and unduly open to the convictions which govern the analyst's selection 'Thus there are alternative 1970-80 annual agricultural output growth estimates for Tanzania from 1.5 per cent to 3.5 per cent. (An ongoing detailed FAO study seems to be coming out in the 2.5 to 3 per Cent range -Agenda uses 1.5 per Cent.) 2 Contrast Wallace [1980] with Agenda (p 53) on World Bank Northern Nigeria Agricultural Projects. Neither is non-partisan and both have selective empirical data (not all of which can be correct!) on 'their side'. Or Green [1982] on external causes of agricultural crises, weaknesses in present capitalist and socialist approaches and priorities with those of Agenda analysis. Again, neither is unbiased, and both are generalising from a very incomplete and doubtfully accurate set of observations (quantitative and qualitative). among inconsistent data.2 As a direct result more data are needed to be even reasonably certain of key priorities, much less their articulation, and a fortiori measurement and evaluation of future results which would allow for more coherent strategy in the future through project testing and adjustment.
Ninth, more knowledge is needed. Packages of knowledge/physical inputs/technology to raise net real output per worker simply do not exist in more than a handful of cases (and equally few adequate delivery systems for what do exist, pages 69-76). In its World Development Report ¡982 the Bank has upgraded this to the main reason for poor performance -a distinct shift from the analysis contained in the Agenda.
And So To Implement Unfortunately, the real and apparent breadth of common ground does not allow any user of the Accelerated Development Report to move directly to implementation. This is not for want of a wide range of proposals (including virtually all those to which the present author or most critics would give high priority). This Agenda proposes almost all plausible lines of action with no systematic setting of priorities except in the vaguest terms, and with careful 'let out' exception citation (eg pages 50-2 on smaliholder emphasis, but not always or only smaliholders). Certainly, no coherent presentation of a consistent priority package and the first stages of articulation is achieved. At most the success and debacle examples illustrate particular policies or approaches in particular contexts. Furthermore the Agenda is not really consistent. For example, it havers on food selfsufficiency, intuitively supporting it, almost pulling back (eg page 65) on the basis of its commitment to letting short run global market prices decide and pushing exports, and also arguing (pages 62-3) that food and export/industrial crops are complementary anyhow.3
These limitations would not matter if theAgenda were consistently seen as a set of suggestions and insights from which, and on the basis of which, to analyse and act in the divergent contexts of different African economies. Admittedly the Report says this at times (eg in President Clausen's 'Foreword'), but the overall tone is one of a direct guide to immediate, relatively uniform action. The latter is certainly how proponents -including the Bank -seek to use the Agenda.
Finally, the common ground is not universal. Some of the proposals seem to be either impossible (for While this may well be true in some contexts it is clearly not always the case (cg cashew versus traditional grains and legumes in Tanzania) and really begs the relative price question. example, raising real agricultural prices in a context of falling national per capita consuming power); ímplausible (for example, raising domestic real prices for export crops whose world market purchasing power is declining sharply); highly contentious on past empirical evidence (for example, the sectoral macroeconomic efficiency of private road haulage and marketing);4 or involve very high-risk for example, export crop emphasis in the face of low -1.6 per cent -projected demand growth (page 23) and highly shaky (indeed altered by the Bank in 1981 as the Report appeared!) positive terms of trade shift projections (page 22). This is not a case for inaction.
Whatever is desirable, continuation of the l970s pattern of policy and performance is impossible given present fiscal and import constraints. It is also highly undesirable given the typically low growth rates of output and the present external balance and terms of trade contexts. For these reasons, among others, dialogue on the Agenda should be both extensive and intensive, articulative and quizzical before any country designs its own Agenda for Action.
Incentives -a Perspective
The importance of incentives is not a matter open to debate. Nor is the importance of material incentives and participation. The divergence is on which incentives are most cost-effective and how to package them in specific contexts.
The Agenda defines an 'incentive structure' as: 'all those aspects of the farmer's environment which affect his willingness to produce and sell', and lists price, marketing, input and consumer goods prices and availability and participation. It quite overtly concentrates on selected aspects of prices and marketing (pages 53-5).
This approach poses certain general problems. First, the coverage is rather narrowly sectoral and economistic. Cost (in time or money) of fuel and water would seem critical incentives to, or constraints on, production; but they are not treated in this context. If peasant answers to open-ended questions are to be believed, access to education and health services are often crucial incentives (or their absence key disincentives) to staying in agriculture. Second, incentive packages may not operate by simple addition (the combinations as well as the elements probably matter). Third, the empirical data on incentives and performance are not such as to permit multiple regression to weight incentives separately, and often are inexplicable without further data. This is quite different from the question of whether they are flexibly profit oriented. That can mean concentration on the 'best business' and the highest profit margins with no gain to overall transport efficiency or peasant share of final market price.
32
Fourth, cost efficient/possible packages and the changes needed to achieve them vary from country to country (and over time).
Price Incentives: Complexities, Ambiguities, Limits
Real prices paid for most African woducers' crops fell during 1970-79 (and during 1979-82) . Within this general decline real prices for domestic food crops fell more slowly (or in some cases, such as Tanzania during 1975-81, rose sharply even at official prices). Real prices for export crops usually plummeted and, with few and brief exceptions, exhibited a downward trend. In general both trends paralleled the evolution of prices at the global level.
In most cases, official farm-gate prices (and probably private and parallel market prices as well) fell as a percentage of wholesale or export proceeds. Real unit costs of other elements (including administration, storage, spoilage, interest charges) also rose, in many cases for reasons including patent inefficiency.
Export taxes (at least since 1977 and dramatically since 1979) have declined as a share of fob value. This has reversed the earlier rise cited in the Agenda (page 55). Farm-gate food prices are now usually above import parity less farm-gate to market costs (which is far more than the older data on page 65 suggest), albeit they are often below parallel market prices.5 Profits of marketing bodies have become virtually historic memory, large losses are typical. In a number of cases post-1979 farm-gate price as a share of final price has risen, but this is due to cuts in export tax and rises in marketing body losses.
These generalisations appear to hold for most countries with no particular correlation to economic strategy (see Harvey's article on Malawi which reveals smallholder results radically worse than the smallholder/plantation data contained in Table SA and storer of last resort capacity; and a means (whether in a marketing board, a fund or by fiscal means to smooth sharp swings)9 would appear the minimum for achieving this price incentive.
Marketing -Availability and Cost
The greatest price disincentive is not being sure where, when or whether there will be a buyer and whether he will pay promptly. Decentralisation provides part of the answerperhaps to rural communities or village-based small businessmen, both of which have some successes on record.
Storage is not mentioned as a priority on the Agenda. This is perhaps because intra-year reserve stocks are rejected in a way which totally ignores transport cost issues, especially for landlocked states (p69 In one case a parallel agency was 'subcontracted' national agricultural price, parastatal control and planning, crop forecasting and target setting and citizen policy/planning personnel development. Over five years it operated autonomously with its advice acted on. Agricultural prices became markedly less consistent (destroying the third ranking agricultural export), in all but one case parastatal financial and physical control collapsed, huge storage losses emerged, no decentralised crop targets were set, senior citizen personnel in the ministry were marginalised and demoralised and the ministry nationally discredited. During 1980-82 citizen ministers and officials clawed back control to the ministry and the overall policy process in the face of external agency opposition, but getting back to square one will take at least five years. 
